ABSTRACT XBRL is an extensible business reporting language. XBRL-adopted financial reporting has been increasingly becoming prevalent in the field of financial accounting information. The related research of XBRL adoption is a hot topic, mainly focusing on technical specifications, classification standards, and application effects of XBRL adoption. However, currently few studies have paid attention to the effect of XBRL-adopted financial reporting on corporate governance, particularly on executive compensation management. Moreover, most of the conclusions from these studies are inconsistent. This paper aims to comprehensively explore the effect of XBRL-adopted financial reporting on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance creatively from a multi-dimensional perspective. This perspective includes three dimensions of the XBRL-adopted time period, firm property, and performance, plus the 3-D crossover. The findings show that a law exists for describing the evolution of the effect of XBRL adoption over time, which indicates that the effect of XBRL adoption during an early period is greater than that during a later period. In the firm property dimension, the sensitivity of executive compensation performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is higher than that of non-SOEs after XBRL adoption, and the sensitivity changing rate of SOEs is also greater than that of non-SOEs. In the firm performance dimension, the sensitivity of the executive compensation performance of well-governed firms is higher than that of poorly governed firms after XBRL adoption, but the sensitivity changing rate of well-governed firms is smaller than that of poorly governed firms. Furthermore, in the cross-dimension of time period and firm property, the effect of XBRL adoption on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance in non-SOEs shows a similar law to that in the time-period dimension. However, no obvious law is shown in SOEs. In the crossdimension of time period and firm performance, the effect of XBRL adoption on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance in well-governed firms also shows a similar law to that in the time-period dimension. However, no obvious law is shown in poorly governed firms. In the cross-dimension of firm property and firm performance, the sensitivity of executive compensation performance is closely correlated to firm performance, and correspondingly, poorly governed non-SOEs show a low sensitivity, which is even significantly lower than those in both the overall poorly governed firms and the overall non-SOEs. The findings can help firms to identify their special properties, performances, and XBRL-adopted time periods to make appropriate decisions to improve the performance of executive compensation management after XBRL adoption.
I. INTRODUCTION
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) requested listed firms to disclose their financial reporting in the form of XBRL in 2009. All listed firms have an obligation to submit XBRL instance documents in their financial reporting and disclose them synchronously on the official websites of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Compared with traditional financial reporting, XBRL-adopted financial reporting is expected to facilitate the accessing and processing of firms' financial reporting information [3] , [8] , which improves the transparency of financial information [1] . This reporting is also expected to promote firms making decisions more appropriately and consequently for improving the firm's performance because information acquired from the nonfalsified instance documents is more reliable and has broader comparability [29] . The expected benefits indicate that XBRL-adopted financial reporting is correlated to the transparency of listed firms. Furthermore, Bushman and Smith [3] demonstrated that the firm's information disclosure could reduce external financing costs by decreasing the estimated risk of investors and improving the securities liquidity. The information disclosure also has the function of corporate governance, namely, restricting executives' decisions to reduce opportunistic behavior and improving corporate governance mechanisms to request executives to lower their expected return rate for reducing capital cost. XBRL-adopted financial reporting has been increasingly more prevalent in the field of financial accounting information. The related research of XBRL adoption is a hot topic, mainly focusing on technical specifications, classification standards and application effects of XBRL adoption in which their effects on information asymmetry and firm performance are frequently involved. These effects inevitably have an impact on executive compensation management, which is currently a hot topic in the internal management of firms. Thus, executive compensation management is bound to be affected by the XBRL adoption, and this effect is often reflected in the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance [12] , [31] . Executive compensation is always determined according to the wealth created for shareholders, which means relating executive compensation to firm performance [21] . The sensitivity of executive compensation performance is an effective indicator to measure this relationship. However, currently few studies have paid attention to the effect of XBRL adoption on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance. Therefore, it is urgent to certify this effect theoretically and empirically.
Currently, the public is increasingly concerned about executive compensation. It is reported that Gong Shaolin, chairman of China Merchants Securities, received 4.83 million yuan in 2011, which is 60 times the average compensation of employees [23] . Moreover, Sun Qingping of China Construction Corporation was paid 9.1 million yuan in 2011, which is 180 times the average compensation of employees [23] . This excessively high compensation has been arousing enormous controversy in society. Given this excessively high compensation, a series of rules and regulations of executive compensation management has been issued in China. However, the benefits of the implementation of these rules and regulations are not optimistic, particularly in SOEs because of their obvious factors of industrial monopoly compared with non-SOEs [34] . Actually, the enhancement of the information disclosure of executive compensation is a common matter that is widely referred to these rules and regulations. This information is often requested to be disclosed in financial reports [35] . XBRL-adopted financial reporting has been becoming increasingly prevalent with the reform of the form of financial reports; thus, it is necessary to explore the effect of XBRL adoption on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance.
This paper investigates the effect of XBRL-adopted financial reporting on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance to provide direct evidence for corporate compensation management. Generally, the adoption of policy or technology has a time law, showing its periodic effects. Thus, the effect of XBRL adoption on executive compensation tends to show a similar time law. Second, the effect of XBRL adoption on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance could be different between SOEs and nonSOEs because of their different modes of executive compensation management resulting from their own properties and governance structures. In addition, firms with different performance levels could also show great differences in the sensitivity of executive compensation performance since the performance acts as a key factor affecting executive compensation. Thus, this paper aims to comprehensively explore the effect of XBRL-adopted financial reporting on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance creatively from a multi-dimensional perspective. This perspective includes the three dimensions of XBRL-adopted time period, firm property and firm performance, as well as the three-dimensional crossover. This paper uses panel data of A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2015 in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from the CSMAR database. Descriptive and fixed-effects analysis are employed to determine the correlations among variables for drawing conclusions to analyze the effect of XBRL adoption on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance.
The contributions of this paper are mainly summarized as the following aspects.
First, this paper builds a direct correlation between executive compensation management and XBRL adoption instead of information disclosure. This direct correlation is seldom involved in the current literature. In addition, the China context, acting as a typical case, is rarely considered in the related research. This context tends to result in special valuable conclusions for enriching and enhancing the understanding of XBRL adoption. Therefore, it is urgent and valuable to explore the effect of XBRL-adopted financial reporting on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance in the China context.
Second, a novel multi-dimensional perspective is creatively used in this exploration for comprehensively investigating the effect of XBRL adoption on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance. This perspective includes three dimensions of XBRL-adopted time period, firm property and firm performance, as well as the three-dimensional crossover. These dimensions facilitate a great possibility for firms to discover valuable laws of the sensitivity for making comprehensive decisions.
Finally, the findings have a strong practical significance. It can help firms to identify their special properties, performances and XBRL-adopted time periods to make appropriate decisions to improve the performance of executive compensation management after XBRL adoption.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section introduces the related research and puts forward the research hypotheses. The third section describes the regression model design and data collection. The main results and discussion are given in the fourth section. Conclusions and limitations as well as the future research direction are presented in the last section. (2008) and Chile (2009) had requested their listed firms to voluntarily or compulsively disclosure XBRL-adopted financial reporting since the idea of XBRL was proposed by Charles Hoffman in 1998. This worldwide request indicates that the XBRL technique has been widely used and recognized as an important competitive means in listed firms [16] .
The above-mentioned related research mainly investigates the effect of XBRL adoption on information processing costs, audit costs and employees from the perspective of information transparency. First of all, the effect of XBRL adoption on information asymmetry is a controversial topic. Yoon et al. [33] believed that information asymmetry can be reduced after the adoption of XBRL based on the South Korean and the European stock markets. That is because the required information can be obtained more easily and accurately and then the cost of accessibility and processing can be reduced. However, Blankespoor et al. [2] and Cong et al. [6] argued that there is a significant positive relationship between XBRL adoption and information asymmetry if the higher abnormal bid-ask spreads are used as independent variables in the US market. Furthermore, Shi and Zhang [26] showed that XBRL-adopted financial reporting is expected to effectively reduce China's capital market stock price synchronicity for it can improve the integration of different items that fully reflect the characteristics of listed firms in financial reporting. This finding can facilitate analysts' accuracy of tracking and prediction and expands analysts' forecast report. Considering audit costs, Shan and Troshani [24] and Shan et al. [25] proposed that the audit fee of the listed firms would decline after the XBRL adoption, and the audit fee has a positive relationship with the size of listed firms in Japan and the United States. Most conclusions about the effect of XBRL adoption on employees are inconsistent. For example, Harris and Morsfield [10] showed that the number of investors and analysts had a negative correlation with XBRL. However, Liu et al. [19] drew the opposite conclusion that the mandatory adoption of XBRL was positive with the number of foresters and accuracy of the analysts from the data of U.S. listed firms from 2009 to 2010. The relevant literature above involves firm costs and employees in which executive and executive agency costs have been ignored when discussing the effect of XBRL adoption. Therefore, this paper comprehensively explores the effect of XBRL-adopted financial reporting on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance to provide effective experience and evidence for executive compensation management.
2) THE SENSITIVITY OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PERFORMANCE
Executive compensation contracts, linking executive compensation to firm performance, are often seen as an important corporate governance mechanism to alleviate agency problems [13] , [17] . This link makes executives involved in the distribution of firm residual income complies with the interests of executives and firm goals [12] . Firm performance is commonly used to measure the behavior and efforts of executives [31] . Information disclosure of firm performance is an important part of corporate governance and is also a concentrated reflection of the efforts of executives to provide feedback to shareholders. Therefore, the disclosure of financial reporting has a certain impact on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance. However, a unified argument about the effect of information disclosure on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance has still not been built. For example, Bushman and Smith [3] noted that the firm's information disclosure had the function of corporate governance, namely, making executives lower the required rate of return and correspondingly reducing the cost of capital by restricting executives' decisions to reduce opportunistic behavior. Wang [28] demonstrated that information transparency could significantly improve the effectiveness of executive compensation. This view indicates that information disclosures play an important role in reducing information asymmetry between shareholders and executives and reducing agency costs. However, Hermalin and Weisbach [11] and Kim et al. [14] indicated that the increase in information disclosure leads to higher compensation for executives in some cases, and meanwhile, the incentive effect of executive compensation is weakened.
XBRL-adopted financial reporting, as a form of emerging information disclosure, affects the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts because this reporting can effectively reduce information asymmetry and create external market supervision for executives. However, most of the literature ignores the direct relationship between XBRL adoption and the sensitivity of executive compensation performance. This paper aims to investigate this relationship to explore its internal mechanism. VOLUME 6, 2018
3) RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES USED IN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED STUDIES
In the literature above, only a single dimension is widely discussed in most of the studies of the effect of XBRL adoption and the sensitivity of executive compensation performance, for example, the firm performance dimension used in [14] and [33] , and the firm property dimension used in [28] . Moreover, most of the other literature fails to involve the dimension perspective in their studies, for example, [2] , [6] , [10] , and [26] .
However, the single dimension perspective is not comprehensive, and its related exploration is often not profound enough. The property of firms in China is diverse, the performance level of firms is different, and the adoption of XBRL has its time period. Therefore, it is extremely necessary to explore the effect of XBRL-adopted financial reporting on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance creatively from a multi-dimensional perspective. This perspective includes the three dimensions of XBRL-adopted time period, firm property and firm performance, as well as the three-dimensional crossover.
B. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Generally, technology adoption has a short-term or longterm impact on firm performance, called the ''Hysteresis Effect'' [22] . Similarly, the effect of the adoption of XBRL technology on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance also tends to show the ''Hysteresis Effect'', indicating the different effects of XBRL adoption during different periods. These differences demonstrate that the effect of XBRL adoption during a later period is generally greater than that during an early period. Therefore, hypothesis 1 (H1) is proposed as follows.
H1: The effect of XBRL adoption on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance during a later period is greater than that during an early period.
SOEs and non-SOEs show a difference in their governance mechanisms in which the principal-agent relationship is more complex in SOEs than that in non-SOEs. This complex relationship indicates that the information asymmetry between shareholders and executives in SOEs is more significant, which accordingly leads to higher agency cost. A direct solution for reducing this information asymmetry between shareholders and executives is to enhance information transparency. Compared with non-SOEs, SOEs have multiple objectives, including maintaining and even increasing the value of their state-owned assets, improving firm profits and sometimes implementing policy tasks, for example, reducing unemployment by over-hiring [27] , [32] . In addition, compared with SOEs, non-SOEs have advantages in enhancing information disclosure and increasing information transparency to adapt to market changes and attract more market investment. Moreover, the corporate system of non-SOEs is relatively perfect on the whole, particularly the supervision and incentive mechanisms of executives' behaviors [30] .
Therefore, the sensitivity of executive compensation performance of SOEs is higher than that of non-SOEs after the adoption of XBRL, and the sensitivity changing rate of nonSOEs is smaller; thus, hypothesis 2 (H2) is proposed.
H2: The sensitivity of executive compensation performance of SOEs is higher than that of non-SOEs after the adoption of XBRL, and the sensitivity changing rate of SOEs is greater than that of non-SOEs.
Since firm performance is one of the most important factors affecting executive compensation, the sensitivity of executive compensation performance at different performance levels tends to show differences [14] . There are many indicators to measure performance level. As the return on assets (ROA) of financial indicators is the objective, the ROA is selected as the indicator of performance to divide the entire sample into a sub-sample of well-governed firms, referring to their ROA being larger than the average, and a sub-sample of poorly-governed firms, indicating that their ROA is smaller than the average. For example, Kim et al. [14] show that executive compensation has a strong correlation with firm performance, and the sensitivity of executive compensation performance in firms of good governance is significantly higher than that of firms with poor governance in South Korea. Moreover, the effect of the sensitivity of executive compensation performance in poorly-governed firms tends to be greatly affected due to their disadvantages of a low management level and poor management structure. On the contrary, well-governed firms tend to be weakly affected as to the sensitivity of executive compensation performance after the enhancing disclosure of information for their perfect systems and strong adaptability to market changes. Thus, this paper posits hypothesis 3 (H3).
H3: The sensitivity of executive compensation performance of well-governed firms is higher than that of poorlygoverned firms after XBRL adoption, but the sensitivity changing rate of well-governed firms is smaller than that of poorly-governed firms.
Hypothesis 1 proposes that the effect of the adoption of XBRL technology on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance for listed firms shows the ''Hysteresis Effect'', reflecting the common law of technology adoption. Given this law, it is necessary to further explore this effect in the cross-dimension of time period and firm property to discover whether firms with different properties show different laws during time periods. Compared with SOEs, non-SOEs are more willing to adjust themselves to the changes in the market and show a more active attitude to the acceptance and adoption of XBRL [5] . However, SOEs are characterized by the lack of the independence of the board and a complicated heterogeneity of the shareholding structure, particularly in central and local SOEs [21] . These characteristics of SOEs make them different in the goals of firm development, which lead to divergent attitudes towards XBRL adoption [21] . Therefore, it is expected that the effect of XBRL adoption on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance in non-SOEs is more intense and tends to show a similar law to that in the time period dimension. However, no obvious law is shown in SOEs. Therefore, hypothesis 4 (H4) is proposed:
H4: The effect of XBRL adoption on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance in non-SOEs shows a similar law to that in the time period dimension. However, no obvious law is shown in SOEs.
Similarly, it is expected to further explore the effect of XBRL adoption in the perspective of the cross-dimension of time period and firm performance based on hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 4. Generally, since well-governed firms have perfect governance structure and performance, their acceptance and adaptation of new policies and technologies are relatively open and advanced. Therefore, well-governed firms are more sensitive to XBRL adoption and generally tend to show a similar law to that in the time period dimension. However, the effect of XBRL adoption on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance may have differences for the different level of firm system and governance structure in poorly-governed firms. Therefore, there is no obvious time law in poorly-governed firms. Thus, hypothesis 5(H5) is proposed.
H5: The effect of XBRL adoption on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance in well-governed firms also shows a similar law to that of the time period dimension. However, no obvious law is shown in poorly-governed firms.
Hypotheses 2 and 3 propose that SOEs and well-governed firms both indicate the high sensitivity of executive compensation performance; thus, well-governed SOEs tend to show a high sensitivity of executive compensation performance. Correspondingly, poorly-governed non-SOEs tend to indicate a low sensitivity of executive compensation performance because both non-SOEs and poorly-governed firms demonstrate a low sensitivity of executive compensation performance. Although both non-SOEs and poorly-governed firms demonstrate a low sensitivity of executive compensation performance, firm performance plays a more key and direct role in the effect of XBRL adoption compared with firm property. From this point of view, poorly-governed SOEs have a low sensitivity of executive compensation performance similar to that of poorly-governed firms, and well-governed non-SOEs have a high sensitivity of executive compensation performance similar to that of well-governed firms. Therefore, hypothesis 6(H6) is proposed.
H6: The sensitivity of executive compensation performance is high in well-governed SOEs, and this sensitivity is low in poorly-governed non-SOEs, and it is correspondingly low in poorly-governed SOEs and high in well-governed non-SOEs.
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY A. ECONOMETRIC MODEL
Conyon and He [7] and Kim et al. [14] proposed econometric models explaining the effect of information disclosure on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance. These models include variables such as return on assets (ROA), total assets (LnSize), market-to-book ratio (MB), CEO, and regional markets (Market), which have been proved to be effective and essential in [4] and [18] . These variables are also included in the model proposed in this paper. In addition, considering the growth opportunities as an important factor in long-term profitability, the variables of leverage ratio (Lev) used in [15] and [28] and the earnings of share (Share) in [20] are integrated into the proposed model to comprehensively support their feedback on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance. A dummy variable XBRL for representing its adoption is included in the proposed model. Actually, compensation management is a complicated system in which many factors are involved. However, it is unpractical or has little value to involve other related weak factors (e.g., corporate structure complexity, namely, number of business, foreign investment business, etc.) in the model. Therefore, these factors are ignored. In conclusion, this paper integrates these factors to build a multiple regression model to support the comprehensive analysis of effect of XBRL adoption from the multi-dimensional perspective. The variable definitions in this model are shown in Table 1 .
Ln(Comp) it
= β 0 + β 1 XBRL + β 2 ROA it + β 3 XBRL * ROA it + β 4 LnSize it + β 5 Share it + β 6 MB it + β 7 Lev it + β 8 CEO it + β 9 Market it
B. DATA AND VARIABLES
In 2009, China requested all listed firms to synchronously disclosure financial reporting in the form of XBRL, and new accounting standards were correspondingly carried out in 2007. Thus, the data of 9 years from 2007 to 2015 of A-share listed firms are chosen as the research sample. The data are restricted with fiscal year-ends in December to ensure homogeneity within the sample. The data processing is described as follows: (i) this paper excludes financial institutions (including monetary and financial services, capital market services, insurance and other financial industries, etc.) among the firms according to the CSRC 2012 industry classification version due to the unique characteristics of financial institutions, for example, financing and investing activities included in the return-on-assets for financial institutions, while financing activities are generally regarded as liabilities for other industry; (ii) the sample of missing data and non-disclosure of executive compensation are excludes; and (iii) this paper excludes the sample of extreme outliers. Executive compensation data and related financial data are collected from the CSMAR database, and the data of regional market level are extracted from regional market level in [9] . This paper uses winsorizing (1%) to address the related research variables to eliminate the influence of outliers. The descriptive analysis of the major variables is given in Table 2 . The average Comp is 1648.226 thousand in the post-mandatory-adoption period, well above the 1008.14 thousand in the pre-mandatory-adoption period, which preliminarily demonstrates the obvious increase in compensation. As a whole, the earning of listed firms is better. The average ROA is approximately 0.039, and the average Share is 0.849. The average Size and MB of listed firms are 9240 million and 0.912, respectively. The rate of executives acting as CEOs is nearly 23.0% in our samples, and this rate reached 24.4% after the adoption of XBRL, which indicates that the concurrent positions of executives and CEOs are even more evident. According to these tables, the data are reasonable and objective for doing the following experiments. Table 3 shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations between the major variables. The lower triangular part is Pearson correlations, and the upper triangular part is Spearman correlations. From the view of collinearity, there is no serious multicollinearity between variables that may affect our regression results. From the results of correlation analysis, the level of Ln(Comp) has a significant positive correlation with ROA, the LnSize, MB , Share, CEO and Market at the 1% significant level. It has a significant negative correlation with Lev at the 1% level, which is similar to [18] . Table 4 demonstrates the effect of XBRL adoption on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance in the time period dimension. Figure 1 shows a tendency that the sensitivity of executive compensation performance increases during the early years of XBRL adoption but then decreases continuously after 2011. The sensitivity changing rate during the early period of the XBRL adoption is bigger than that during the later period, which indicates that this significant effect is weakened gradually. These above findings are different from the general ''Hysteresis Effect'' of technology adoption. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is not supported. The underlying reason could be that the topic of executive compensation tended to attract wide attention during the early period of XBRL adoption. is −0.7665. The coefficient between ROA and Ln(Comp) is 0.5646, and that between XBRL * ROA and Ln(Comp) is −0.0514, while they are not significant in the sample of non-SOEs. The results show that the sensitivity of executives compensation performance in SOEs is 1.0397 (1.8062-0.7665), greater than that of non-SOEs' 0.5132 (0.5646-0.0514). However, the results show that changing rate of sensitivity of executives compensation performance in SOEs has a significant decreasing trend (-0.7665) after the adoption of XBRL, while no significant changing rate is found in non-SOEs. The findings demonstrate that the sensitivity of executive compensation performance in SOEs would be regulated after XBRL adoption because SOEs have a special property and governance structure different from non-SOEs in which their sensitivity shows a weak changing rate. These findings confirm hypothesis 2.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

A. RESULTS OF HYPOTHESIS 1
B. RESULTS OF HYPOTHESIS 2
C. RESULTS OF HYPOTHESIS 3
According to the results in Table 6 , it can be found that ROA has a significantly positive correlation (1.2945) with Ln(Comp) in the sub-sample of well-governed firms. However, the interaction of XBRL * ROA and Ln(Comp) has a negative coefficient (-0.2689) but is not significant. While in the sub-sample of poorly-governed firms, the coefficient between ROA and Ln(Comp) is significantly positive (1.1257), but the relationship of XBRL * ROA with Ln(Comp) is -0.82 at the 1% significance level. These results show that ROA is closely related to Ln(Comp), and after the adoption of XBRL, the sensitivity of executive compensation performance in well-governed firms (1.0256) is significantly higher than that of poorly-governed firms (0.3053), but the sensitivity changing rate of well-governed firms is smaller than that of poorly-governed firms (|-.2689| < |-0.8204|). These results support hypotheses 3. Compared with poorly-governed firms, well-governed firms generally have advantages in the compensation management system and compensation supervisory mechanism, which make it difficult for executives to seek personal profits by their own rights to improve their compensation. Given these advantages, wellgoverned firms show a high sensitivity of executive compensation performance and weak changing rate after XBRL adoption.
D. RESULTS OF HYPOTHESIS 4
According to Table 8 and Figure 4 , the changing rate of the sensitivity of executive compensation performance in non-SOEs during the early period of the XBRL adoption is larger than that during the later period, but the changing rate gradually decreases to a stable level over time. These results show that the effect of XBRL adoption on the sensitivity in non-SOEs reflects a time law that is consistent with the law concluded in hypothesis 1. However, no obvious law is shown in SOEs according to Table 7 and Figure 3 . Hypothesis 4 is confirmed by these findings, which partly explain that nonSOEs respond more actively to the adoption of XBRL technology due to their own property and governance structure compared with SOEs. 
E. RESULTS OF HYPOTHESIS 5
According to Table 9 and Figure 5 , the changing rate of the sensitivity of executive compensation performance in well-governed firms during the early period of the XBRL adoption is larger than that during the later period, but the changing rate gradually decreases to a stable level over time. These results illustrate that the effect of XBRL adoption on the sensitivity in well-governed firms reflects a time law that is consistent with the law concluded in hypothesis 1. However, no obvious law is shown in poorly-governed firms according to Table 10 and Figure 6 . Hypothesis 5 is confirmed by these findings, which partly explain that well-governed firms respond more actively to the adoption of XBRL technology due to their relatively perfect governance model and compensation management system compared with poorlygoverned firms.
F. RESULTS OF HYPOTHESIS 6
Column (1) in Table 9 shows, in the sub-sample of SOEs * well-governed firms, that the correlation coefficient of ROA and Ln(Comp) is significantly positive (1.6607), but the coefficient of the interaction of XBRL * ROA is significantly negative (-0.6492). The results indicate that well-governed SOEs have a high sensitivity of executive compensation performance (1.0115 = 1.6607-0.6492), which is equivalent to the sensitivity of well-governed firms (1.0256). Column (4) shows, in the sub-sample of non-SOEs * poorlygoverned firms, that the correlation coefficient of ROA and Ln(Comp) is negative (−0.0611), but the coefficient of the interaction of XBRL * ROA is negative (-0.023). The results demonstrate that poorly-governed non-SOEs have a low sensitivity of executive compensation performance (-0.0841 = -0.0611-0.0230), even significantly lower than that (0.3053) of all poorly-governed firms and that (0.5132) of all non-SOEs.
Column (2) shows, in the sub-sample of SOEs * poorlygoverned firms, that the correlation coefficient of ROA and Ln(Comp) is negative (-0.0043), but the coefficient of the interaction XBRL * ROA is significantly positive (0.2895). The results illustrate that poorly-governed SOEs also have a low sensitivity of executive compensation performance (0.2852 = −0.0043+0.2852), which is equivalent to the sensitivity of poorly-governed firms (0.3053).
Column (3) demonstrates, in the sub-sample of nonSOEs * well-governed firms, that the correlation coefficient of ROA and Ln(Comp) is positive (0.0422) at the 10% significance level, but the coefficient of the interaction of XBRL * ROA is significantly negative (1.1599). The results show that well-governed non-SOEs have a high sensitivity of executive compensation performance (1.2021 = 0.0422+1.1599), which is equivalent to the sensitivity of well-governed firms (1.0256), and the changing rate of sensitivity of executive compensation performance is significant. The above results confirm hypothesis 6.
Given the results above, the sensitivity of executive compensation performance is closely correlated to firm performance. That is, good performance contributes to the high sensitivity of executive compensation performance regardless of firm property, while poor performance indicates the low sensitivity of executive compensation performance. Hypothesis 6 is fundamentally consistent with hypothesis 3 and even improves on hypothesis 3 with more detail. These cross-dimensional results provide a more comprehensive decision-making basis to help firms to identify their special properties, performances and XBRL-adopted time periods to make appropriate decisions to improve the performance of executive compensation management after XBRL adoption.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The CSRC requested listed firms to disclosure XBRL financial reporting synchronously in the XBRL platform of the Exchange in 2009. In theory, the adoption of XBRL can improve information acquisition and transparency and in turn contribute to public supervision. This paper examines the role of corporate governance after the mandatory adoption of XBRL by investigating the effect of XBRL on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance. This paper innovatively and comprehensively explores the effect of XBRL-adopted financial reporting on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance creatively from a multidimensional perspective. This perspective includes the three dimensions of the XBRL-adopted time period, firm property and performance, as well as the three-dimensional crossover. The previous literature has studied executive compensation obviously from information disclosure. Furthermore, this paper focuses the background of XBRL adoption to investigate its effect on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance. However, this related research is still in its infancy in China, and most of the research focuses on the theoretical analysis of XBRL classification standards, while a gap remains in the empirical study of the effect of XBRL adoption. The findings of this paper indicate that the effect of XBRL adoption on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance has a specific time law, and there are different laws reflecting the sensitivity of executive compensation performance for firms with different properties and performance levels. In the cross-dimensions, the sensitivity of executive compensation performance after the XBRL adoption presents some obvious laws that are different from the ones in a single dimension. These results reveal the time period of XBRL adoption, firm property, and firm performance, which have great impacts on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance. These results provide significant managerial insights for the improvement of the corporate compensation system. In this manner, firms can further strengthen the supervision of information disclosure based on XBRL and improve information transparency for firms to establish appropriate incentive mechanisms to promote their compensation management and resource optimization. Meanwhile, the research results also provide empirical evidence for supervision departments to effectively grasp the future directions and strengthen the supervision of XBRL adoption.
This paper still has some limitations. For example, it is needed to further verify the time laws of the effect of XBRL adoption on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance and explore the new development of these laws in the future. Furthermore, the difference in the sensitivity of executive compensation performance after XBRL adoption between central SOEs and local SOEs could be an interesting and valuable topic. 
